Two alternative approaches are used in audit practice to make quantitative materiality assessments about proposed audit adjustments. The cumulative approach (often called the "iron curtain" approach in practice) compares to net income the total amount of misstatement existing at the end of the current period, while the current-period approach (often called the "rollover" approach in practice) compares to net income the amount of misstatement added in the current period. Depending on the specific context, either of these approaches could make a misstatement appear more material quantitatively. The Panel on Audit Effectiveness and the SEC have expressed concern that these alternative materiality approaches could affect auditor judgments, but no research has investigated this question. We report the results of an experiment in which 234 audit managers and partners from one Big 4 firm completed eight cases that required them to determine whether the final outcome of an audit would be to book or waive a proposed adjusting journal entry. We manipulated materiality approach between auditors by providing auditors with either the current-period or cumulative formats used at their firm to summarize proposed audit adjustments. Results indicated a robust and often unintentional effect of materiality approach on auditors' adjustment decisions, regardless of whether misstatements were large or small, subjective or objective, and income increasing or income decreasing.
Quantitative Materiality Perspectives and Auditors' Disposition of Detected Misstatements

I. Introduction
Materiality judgments are fundamental to the preparation of financial statements. In Concept Statement 2, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) identified materiality as one of the qualitative characteristics of accounting information, and recognized that "those who make accounting decisions and those who make judgments as auditors continually confront the need to make judgments about materiality" (CON 2, par. 123). Indeed, the auditor's opinion states whether or not the financial statements are "presented fairly, in all material respects" in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. However, standard setters have not promulgated quantitative materiality guides, methods or criteria that preparers could look to for authoritative support, instead opting to discuss qualitative and quantitative materiality considerations.
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Perhaps as a result of this lack of guidance, two alternative approaches have been developed in audit practice to make quantitative materiality assessments about proposed audit adjustments (Panel on Audit Effectiveness 2000). The two approaches differ in how they calculate the amount of misstatement that is compared to net income when determining materiality. The cumulative approach compares to net income the total amount of misstatement existing at the end of the current period (i.e., the amount necessary to correct the balance sheet).
The current-period approach compares to net income the amount of misstatement added in the current period. As demonstrated in section II, either the cumulative or the current-period approach can make a given misstatement appear more material, depending on the relation between prior-period and current-period misstatements. 2 Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) 47 implicitly permits both the cumulative and current-period approaches by categorizing materiality approach as an accounting choice that is not addressed in the statement (footnote to par. 30). Yet, unlike other important accounting choices, there exists no requirement for either issuers or auditors to disclose externally which approach is applied, and we are unaware of any instances of issuers or auditors voluntarily doing so. The Panel on Audit Effectiveness (2000) reported that both approaches are used in practice, and concluded that permitting both approaches is "potentially confusing." Therefore, the Panel recommended that the ASB, in cooperation with the FASB if necessary, specify only one approach for handling prior-period uncorrected misstatements when determining whether proposed adjustments are material (par. 2.177). While the ASB did add this matter to its agenda, no new guidance has been provided. The SEC has expressed a preference for the cumulative approach in prior speeches (Turner 2000) , but no formal SEC guidance has been provided.
Although the effect of materiality approach on materiality calculations can be demonstrated by example, absent empirical evidence it is unclear whether materiality approach affects auditors' decisions about whether to require a client to record proposed audit adjustments.
Auditors may be reluctant to waive any adjustments in the current reporting climate, regardless of the approach used to assess quantitative materiality, given (1) recent guidance from the SEC (SAB 99) and ASB (AU Sec 312) emphasizing qualitative materiality dimensions, (2) recent guidance from the ASB that discourages auditors from waiving audit adjustments by requiring that auditors report waived audit adjustments to their clients' audit committees (SAS 89) and discuss with audit committees the quality of their clients' earnings (SAS 90), and (3) recent wellpublicized audit failures and heightened concern about audit quality. Or, auditors may waive some audit adjustments, but without approach having an effect, because auditors are cautious about having their decisions influenced by an approach-driven difference in materiality assessment and/or because auditors focus primarily on aspects of the misstatement itself. On the other hand, auditors' may intentionally consider approach, particularly for large misstatements, because they view approach as an audit policy adopted for their client. Finally, auditors' decisions may be influenced unintentionally by approach, because they mechanically incorporate quantitative materiality into decisions without considering any potential effect of approach.
Our study investigates whether materiality approach affects auditors' decisions about proposed audit adjustments. We performed an experiment in which 57 audit partners and 177 audit managers from one Big 4 firm completed eight cases that required them to determine whether the final outcome of an audit would be to book or waive a proposed adjusting journal entry. The auditors were from a firm that designates clients as evaluated under either the cumulative or current-period approach. We manipulated materiality approach between auditors by providing auditors with either the "rollover" (i.e., current-period) or "iron-curtain" (i.e., cumulative) formats used at their firm to summarize proposed audit adjustments. We varied elements of the cases to allow us to test the robustness of any effects of materiality approach to amount size, misstatement subjectivity, effect on current income, and amount precision. To allow us to determine whether any effect of approach was intentional, auditors indicated during debriefing whether they believed their adjustment decisions are affected by materiality approach.
Our results indicate that materiality approach influenced auditors' decisions about whether a proposed audit adjustment would be waived or booked. Holding constant all information about the client, prior-year misstatements, and current-year misstatements, auditors were more likely to require adjustment under the materiality approach that produced the higher apparent materiality. This result was present directionally for all eight cases, was at least marginally significant for seven of eight cases, and occurred for misstatements that were large or small, subjective or objective, and income increasing or income decreasing. Materiality approach had the strongest effect for a case involving a large, objectively defined, incomeincreasing cutoff error that appeared immaterial under the current-period method but material under the cumulative approach. The effect of approach does not have to be intentional, as the effect did not differ depending on whether auditors indicated during debriefing that approach affects adjustment decisions.
Consistent with prior research, auditors were more likely to require adjustment when misstatements were large and increased income. Auditors also were more likely to require adjustment when a misstatement was defined as the lower point of a range of possible values than when a misstatement was defined as a point estimate, although this result applied primarily to audit managers.
These results indicate that materiality approach can have an important influence on audit judgments, suggesting potential differences between the amount of post-audit misstatement existing in the financial statements of companies audited under different materiality approaches, as well as the potential for misinterpretation of audit reports by financial statement users. One possible remedy would be for standard setters to follow a recommendation of the Panel on Audit
Effectiveness (2000) and require either the cumulative or current-period approach to be used on all audits. However, given that there are some contexts in which each materiality approach provides the higher apparent materiality, it is unclear which approach standard-setters should mandate. A second remedy is to require disclosure of materiality approach along with other key accounting choices in the "significant accounting policies" section of financial statement footnotes. While this remedy might allow users to better interpret the audit report, it would be of limited usefulness if users lack the information necessary to understand the implications of a particular approach for their company. A third remedy would be for auditors to be required to apply both approaches when evaluating materiality, and only waive adjustments that are immaterial from both perspectives. Fourth, standard-setters might consider mandating that auditor communications with audit committees include the materiality approach applied on the engagement and the implications of this application. The SEC has encouraged such communications (Turner 2000) , but not required them.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides examples of the effects of materiality approach on materiality assessments, describes related research, and states our hypothesis and robustness checks. Section III describes method, and Section IV provides results.
Section V provides a summary and discussion of implications.
II. Background
Examples of the Current-Period and Cumulative Materiality Approaches
"Cookie Jar" Reserves
Whether the current-period or cumulative approach yields a higher apparent materiality depends on the specific context in which the approach is applied. For example, consider the case of "cookie jar" reserves, whereby firms overstate expenses to build an excess reserve that can be adjusted downward in a future period to increase income (Levitt 1998) . Assume a company increases a loan-loss reserve by recognizing excess expense of $10 million in three consecutive periods, with the intention of reducing the reserve (and increasing income) by $30 million in the fourth period. The cumulative approach focuses on the amount of misstatement in the end-ofperiod reserve balance, so calculates quantitative materiality based on a misstatement of ($10) in period 1, ($20) in period 2, ($30) in period 3, and $0 in period 4 (since reduction of the reserve by $30 during period 4 eliminates any overstatement in the period 4 reserve balance). The current-period approach focuses on the new misstatement added in the current period, so calculates quantitative materiality based on a misstatement of ($10) in periods 1-3 and $30 in period 4 (since reduction of the reserve increases period 4 income by $30). For this example the cumulative approach provides higher apparent materiality during the reserve build-up, and so may reduce the likelihood that an auditor allows a large reserve to accumulate. The currentperiod approach provides higher apparent materiality during the period in which the reserve is reduced, and so might better highlight the need for a prior-period adjustment in that period.
Cutoff Errors
Materiality differences between current-period and cumulative approaches are not confined to reserves. Rather, holding constant a current-year misstatement, the current-period and cumulative approaches can yield different apparent materiality whenever prior-year audit adjustments were waived. As another example, assume a firm has a recurring "late cutoff" error, such that prior-year sales included $10 million of current-year sales, and current-year sales include $12 million of next-year sales. The cumulative approach focuses on the end-of-period error in accounts receivable and equity, and quantifies the misstatement as a $12 million overstatement. The current-period approach offsets the $10 million understatement or currentyear sales that resulted from the prior-year late cutoff with the $12 million overstatement that resulted from the current-year late cutoff, and quantifies the misstatement as a net $2 million overstatement. Thus, the cumulative approach yields a higher apparent materiality. Now modify the cutoff example by instead assuming an early cutoff in the prior year, such that $10 million of prior-year sales are included in current-year sales, as well as retaining the assumption of a late cutoff in the current year, such that $12 million of next-year sales are included in the current year. In this case, the cumulative approach provides the same $12 million-based materiality as it did in the other example. However, the current-period approach views the prior-year and current-year misstatements as having compounding effects on currentyear net income of $10 + $12 = $22 million, thus yielding a higher apparent materiality. This example illustrates how differences between approaches are driven by prior-period waived misstatements, and that the relation between the prior-period and current-period misstatement determines which approach yields the higher materiality.
The Effects of Materiality Approach: Related Research
We test whether current-period and cumulative approaches influence auditors' decisions about whether to waive adjustment of a detected misstatement. We predict that, holding constant all aspects of prior-period and current-period misstatements, financial statements, company, etc., auditors are more likely to require adjustment under the approach that makes the current-period misstatement appear larger quantitatively. We are not aware of any research that directly examines this issue, although it does relate to prior accounting research concerning format effects, framing, and decision aids.
Format Effects
The current-period and cumulative approaches are implemented via the format of the audit workpaper (hereafter, the "scoresheet") used to accumulate and evaluate proposed audit adjustments, holding constant the information provided to auditors, so any effect of materiality approach could be viewed as a format effect. Much financial accounting research indicates that how information is displayed can affect judgment.
3 However, format studies typically vary the extent to which information is recognized in income vs. disclosed in a footnote or non-income statement, while we hold constant the presentation of the adjustment and only vary whether the cumulative or current-period approach is used to determine the impact of the adjustment as a percentage of income.
Framing
Materiality approaches can be viewed as altering the framing of an adjustment for purposes of materiality determination. For example, when considering a bad debts reserve, the current-period approach can be viewed as calculating materiality based on the difference between the amount of period-end misstatement in the reserve and a reference point of the amount of misstatement existing at the beginning of the period, while the cumulative approach calculates materiality based on the difference between the year-end misstatement and a reference point of zero. Prior research indicates that investors appear to be influenced by reference points (Schrand and Walther 2000; Krische 2002; Tan et al. 2002) . But, prior audit research provides mixed results concerning auditors' vulnerability to framing effects (see, e.g., Chung and Monroe 2000; Emby 1994; Shields et al. 1987; Kida 1984) , and suggests that auditors may be less vulnerable to psychological biases in general because their task-relevant expertise and knowledge allows them to avoid being influenced by surface-level contextual features (Smith and Kida 1991) . Given that the information necessary to evaluate materiality from either materiality approach is always available, auditors may be uninfluenced by framing considerations induced by materiality approach.
Decision Aids
Materiality approaches can be viewed as alternative decision aids designed to facilitate materiality judgments. Numerous auditing studies suggest that decision aids can improve judgment in many circumstances, but also that auditors may be overconfident in their own judgment and circumvent the intended effect of decision aids (Eining et al. 1997) . For example, auditors may "work backward" from some intended conclusion to determine the inputs necessary to justify their preferred conclusion (e.g., Kachelmeier and Messier 1990; Messier et al. 2001) , or may shift their judgments away from those recommended by the aid because of a preference for outcomes different from those indicated by the aid (e.g., Ashton 1990; Boatsman et al. 1997 ).
More generally, research suggests that auditors make decisions largely consistent with their incentives when governed by subjective criteria like materiality thresholds (see Nelson 2003 for a review, and Libby and Kinney 2000 for recent evidence). Thus, auditors may not be influenced by these materiality approaches, given that both approaches provide much latitude for auditors to require clients to book or waive audit adjustments.
Factors Potentially Moderating the Effect of Materiality Approach
A number of factors potentially moderate the effect of materiality approach, including adjustment size, misstatement subjectivity, current-year income effect, and adjustment precision.
We consider each of these in our experimental design.
Adjustment Size
Error size represents a key element of materiality, and research indicates that auditors are more likely to waive smaller adjustments (Braun 2001; Houghton and Fogarty 1991; Icerman and Hillison 1991; Wright and Wright 1997) . However, this research was conducted in the 1990's and before. Thus, it reflects materiality judgments prior to an arguably more conservative financial-reporting climate that has emerged following recent scandals, regulatory activity and the demise of Andersen. For example, the SEC's recently issued SAB 99 discourages registrants and auditors from solely relying on a heuristic such as the "5% rule" for determining quantitative materiality, and generally encourages auditors to use more stringent quantitative and qualitative materiality guidelines. Thus, materiality approach may matter more when errors are of less than 5 percent materiality, because in today's environment auditors typically adjust all large errors, regardless of perspective. Alternatively, materiality approach may matter more if it determines whether an error exceeds the 5 percent threshold, because that threshold continues to be an important determinant in auditors' adjustment decisions. 4 Therefore, we compare the effect of materiality approach between large and small adjustments.
Misstatement Subjectivity
Misstatements can differ in the extent to which they involve judgment. For example, a cutoff error typically is objectively verifiable, whereas a reserve typically involves subjective assessment. Several studies provide evidence that auditors are less likely to require adjustment when amounts are subjective (e.g., Wright and Wright 1997; Braun 2001 ) and when there is more latitude in the relevant accounting standards (Nelson 2003) . However, Libby and Kinney (2000) find that auditors are willing to waive adjustment of both objective and subjective amounts when amounts are immaterial quantitatively, suggesting that subjectivity matters more when errors are of larger size, such that materiality approach may have an effect for smaller misstatements regardless of subjectivity. Therefore, we assess the generality of the effects of materiality approach by examining decisions with respect to both objectively determined cutoff errors and subjectively determined bad-debts reserves.
Current-Year Income Effect
Auditors' risk of litigation is highest for overstatements of current income and equity (St. Pierre and Anderson 1984; Carcello and Palmrose 1994) , and auditing texts encourage auditors to focus on detecting overstatements of current-year net income and equity (e.g., Arens and Loebbecke 1997) . Prior studies have demonstrated that auditors tend to propose more incomedecreasing adjustments (Kinney and Martin 1994) , and are more likely to require that clients book income-decreasing adjustments (Braun 2001; Nelson et al. 2002) , particularly when the adjustments are large (Wright and Wright 1997) . Given the robustness of these effects, it may be that income-decreasing (income-increasing) adjustments are rarely (typically) waived, such that materiality approach has little effect. Therefore, we compare the effect of materiality approach between income-increasing and income-decreasing adjustments.
Adjustment Precision
FASB Interpretation
No. 14 provides guidance about SFAS No. 5 implementation, and
indicates that, if a range of contingent-liability amounts is equally likely, the low end of the range should be accrued. Thus, GAAP accrual requirements make no distinction between a point estimate and the low endpoint of a range. Yet, an auditor who must determine whether or not to waive a proposed adjustment may consider range information suggesting that the possible true liability could exceed the amount that GAAP requires be recorded. Thus, the existence of a range of higher possible outcomes might communicate additional uncertainty about misstatement size to auditors, and render them less likely to waive adjustment. In those circumstances, materiality approach may have little effect. Therefore, we compare the effect of materiality approach between point estimates and ranges, holding constant the amount of adjustment proposed.
III. Method Overview
In our experiment, auditors from one Big-4 audit firm determine for eight cases whether the final outcome with respect to a proposed audit adjustment would be to waive the adjustment or require that it be booked. The experiment has a 2 × 2 × 8 mixed design, with materiality approach (current-period vs. cumulative) and Q of E (prompted vs. not prompted to consider quality-of-earnings implications of the client's preferred accounting treatment) manipulated between participants, 5 and case (1-8) manipulated within participants.
Participants and Administration
The experiment requires relatively experienced auditors as participants, given that it involves decisions about disposition of audit adjustments. Materials were pilot tested with four audit managers, and 234 auditors participated in the experiment (57 audit partners with an average of 21 years of experience; 177 audit managers with an average of 8.3 years of experience). The experiment was administered in 6 training sessions conducted by the participants' firm during autumn of 2002. The first training session included only partner participants; subsequent sessions included only manager participants. Materials were identical in all sessions, except that after the first session we clarified wording and modified a number in one case to strengthen a manipulation. 6 Any significant effects of session are discussed in the results section.
Procedure and Variables
Instructions
Participants started the experiment by reading along while a researcher read aloud a letter from a well-known senior partner requesting their participation in the experiment. The letter stated that the firm worked with the researchers to ensure that the cases included all necessary information, that the anonymity of the auditors, the firm, and of all the firm's audit clients was assured, and concluded with: "Therefore, although I realize that these sorts of judgments are of a sensitive nature, I ask that you act as you would on an actual client engagement when completing the case studies. The value of this research to the Firm depends on your providing responses that are as realistic as possible."
Participants then read instructions emphasizing that they would be provided with background information about a client and then be presented with eight independent case scenarios about the client. They were again told to put themselves in the position of an auditor who has to make this particular decision, as if their typical SEC client was facing this set of circumstances.
Background Information
We adapted background information from materials developed by Braun (2001) and Libby and Kinney (2000) .
To portray a client of moderate risk that was near enough to important thresholds for audit adjustments to be of concern, the client, Capital Auto Parts, Inc. ("CAP"), was described as a medium-sized, SEC-listed client that has been profitable and growing for the prior five years, but with current year performance lagging prior year performance. Participants were told that management and analysts foresee continued growth, but management remains very concerned about CAP's ability to generate performance that consistently meets analyst forecasts.
Participants were provided with current year pre-audit balances of key income-statement and balance-sheet accounts, adapted from Braun (2001) and based on medians for SIC code 75, "Auto Repair, Services, and Parking."
To portray a client of at least moderate importance to the auditor, CAP was described as providing a large share of the audit office's work and fees, and as helping to maintain the office's profile and status among competing auditing firms.
To alleviate any concerns about the audit other than those identified in the materials, CAP's controls were described as adequate, and auditors were informed that all standard audit tests had been completed by competent staff and reviewed to the participant's satisfaction, resulting in the adjustments proposed.
To ensure that auditors perceived a need to consider waiving proposed adjustments, they were told: "The client is strongly pressuring you to waive the proposed adjustments. They feel that the financial statements are fairly presented as is and therefore are eager to release the unadjusted figures to the financial press as soon as possible. The client expressed this opinion so strongly that you believe there is a risk of losing the client if you insist that the financial statements be adjusted. At the same time, the client insists on receiving an unqualified opinion on the financial statements."
The background information also included a description of the materiality approach (current-period or cumulative) to which participants had been assigned. We adapted these descriptions, shown in Figure 1 , from the audit manual provided by the participants' firm, clarifying some wording and insuring that the descriptions were of approximately the same length.
Cases
The first page of each case described a prior-year waived audit adjustment (or stated that none existed) relevant to the current-year proposed adjustment, and required participants to identify the direction and amount of the income-effect of the prior-year adjustment. Thus, regardless of the materiality approach to which they had been assigned, all auditors confirmed their understanding of prior-year waived adjustments before making current-year judgments.
The second page of each case was a fold-out spreadsheet that exactly replicated the scoresheet used by the audit firm to record proposed audit adjustments. Regardless of materiality perspective, the scoresheet always used the same format to identify the proposed audit adjustment (including journal entry and explanation), as well as the before-tax effect of the proposed adjustment on the balance sheet, income statement, comprehensive income and cash flows. Then, depending on whether the current-period or cumulative approach is used, the scoresheet either did or did not offset the before-tax income effect of the adjustments with prior year "rolled over" adjustments before listing a final before-tax and after-tax amount of adjustment and comparing the adjustment on a percentage basis to before-tax and after-tax net income.
Participants recorded their responses in the lower right-hand portion of the scoresheet.
All participants answered two questions. Responses to the first of these two questions became our primary dependent variable. The question was: "With respect to this specific case, the eventual outcome in the audit would be (circle on answer): As shown in Table 1 , the eight cases varied in terms of the materiality approach providing the higher apparent materiality (current-period or cumulative higher), misstatement type (cutoff errors vs. bad-debts reserves), adjustment income effect (income increasing vs.
income decreasing), level of adjustment materiality when viewed from the higher materiality approach (from greater than 5 percent materiality down to 2.36 percent materiality), and whether the proposed adjustment was based on a point estimate or a range. Because of concerns about time available during the data-collection sessions, we did not fully cross all case dimensions, but rather developed the cases to enable particular comparisons. Specific comparisons and cases are discussed in the results section.
Cases appeared in 15 different orders. Five cases involved a bad debts reserve and three involved a cutoff error. Therefore, to reduce potential confusion of cases and carryover effects, each order of cases began with a bad-debts case, alternated bad-debts and cutoff cases, and ended with two bad-debts cases, with the case providing range information always appearing last to avoid contaminating other cases with range considerations. Subject to those constraints, orders were balanced. Order is not significant when included as a variable in any analysis.
Debriefing
Participants concluded the experiment by completing a short debriefing questionnaire.
Most participants completed the experiment in 40 minutes; none exceeded one hour.
IV. Results
Comprehension Checks
Analyses of debriefing questions indicate that participants understood case materials. or between cases. Only four participants answered more than two comprehension checks incorrectly. Results do not change with these participants omitted from analyses.
Hypothesis Test
Overall Analysis
To test for an overall effect of materiality approach, we identify for each case the approach that provides the higher apparent materiality. Because each participant was assigned to either the current-period or cumulative treatment, a participant was in the treatment that showed higher apparent materiality for some cases and lower apparent materiality for other cases. For each subject and each case, we coded a variable, "perspective", with a 1 (0) if the subject was in the treatment that yielded the higher (lower) apparent materiality for that particular case. Results also indicated a significant main effect for session (p = 0.0078). However, this appears to be driven by the one case (case D) for which we increased error size between the first session and subsequent sessions. 9 When this case is omitted from this analysis, session becomes insignificant, suggesting that the session effect is driven primarily by auditors unwillingness to waive adjustment of larger misstatements, rather than suggesting that results differ systematically between partners and managers. Regardless, the effect of materiality perspective does not interact with session, indicating that materiality approach affects partners and managers to the same extent.
Examining individual cases in Table 1 indicates that by far the largest effect of perspective is observed for case F. This case involves an objective, income-increasing cutoff error that is greater than 5 percent of net income from a cumulative approach (as ending net assets and equity are misstated by that amount), but almost 0 percent of net income from a current-period approach (because adjustment of a similar-sized error was waived in the prior year, and reversal of the prior-year error in the current period offsets the current-year error).
Auditors under a cumulative approach waived this error only 23 percent of the time, while auditors under a current-period approach waived this error 70 percent of the time. However, if case F is dropped from the overall analysis, perspective is still significant (p = .003), indicating that the general effect of perspective is not driven by one case.
Previously we noted that the Panel on Audit Effectiveness (2000) suggested the ASB mandate the use of only one materiality approach. However, there are some contexts where the current-period approach provides higher apparent materiality, and others where it provides lower apparent materiality, depending on the relation between prior-period and current-period 
Tests of Robustness of the Effect of Materiality Approach
Adjustment Size and Subjectivity
The cases used to assess robustness of the effects of materiality approach to adjustment size and subjectivity are shown in Table 2 . We analyzed the 2 × 2 × 2 contingency table formed
by materiality approach (current-period v. cumulative), size of highest apparent materiality (greater or less than 5 percent), and subjectivity (cutoff error vs. reduction of cookie-jar reserve).
Logistic regression results reveal a three-way interaction (p < 0.0007), indicating that the relation between materiality approach and size differs depending on subjectivity. 11 We break the threeway interaction into two two-way interactions according to subjectivity. Focusing on only recurring cutoff errors (cases F and B), there is a significant interaction between approach and case (p < 0.0001), and simple effects indicate that auditors are more likely to require adjustment under the cumulative approach when the misstatement is large than they are under the currentperiod approach and/or when the misstatement is small. 12 Focusing on only reductions of reserves (cases E and C), there is no interaction between approach and case (p = 0.8789), and main effects indicate that auditors are more likely to require adjustment under the current-period approach (which makes materiality appear higher, p < 0.05) and when the misstatement is large (p < 0.0001).
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This analysis leads to a few conclusions. First, materiality approach has some effect in all cells, indicating that its effect is robust. Second, with large misstatements, approach matters more in the objective cutoff setting (case F) than in the subjective reserve-reduction setting (case E). One way to think about this is that subjectivity offsets some of the effect of approach. In the objective setting, the cumulative approach highlights a clear balance sheet distortion, and the current-period approach highlights a clearly negligible income effect. In the subjective setting, the cumulative approach highlights a balance-sheet correction that may be opportunistic, while the current-period approach highlights an income increase that could be the result of an honest revision of estimate. Thus, misstatement subjectivity may allow auditors to rationalize making both adjustment decisions, such that they produce a less extreme proportion of adjustment decisions than they do when a misstatement has been assessed objectively. Table 3 shows the cases used to assess robustness of the effects of materiality approach to directional income effect of the adjustment. We analyzed the 2 × 2 contingency table formed by materiality approach (current-period v. cumulative) and income effect (increase, decrease).
Current-Period Income Effect
Consistent with prior research, income effect is significant, indicating that auditors are less likely to waive adjustments of income-increasing errors than they are adjustments of incomedecreasing errors (p = 0.003). Materiality approach is marginally significant (p = 0.0733). There is no interaction between approach and income effect, indicating that the effects of approach are robust to differences in directional income effect. Table 4 shows the cases used to assess robustness of the effects of materiality approach to misstatement precision. For both cases, we held constant the amount of misstatement, but varied misstatement precision by defining the misstatement as a point estimate for case G but as the low end of a range for case H. 14 We analyzed the 2 × 2 contingency table formed by materiality approach (current-period v. cumulative) and precision (point estimate v. end point of range).
Misstatement Precision
Results indicate a significant main effect of precision (p = 0.0012), but no significant interaction with or main effects of approach, although simple effects tests suggest that approach influences adjustment decisions when adjustments are defined by point estimates (p = 0.07), but not otherwise. These results are consistent with auditors being less likely to waive adjustment in the range setting, regardless of materiality approach, perhaps because of a concern that actual misstatements might exceed the lower-bound adjustment required by GAAP. Regarding effects of materiality approach, perhaps the only conclusion possible from this analysis is that approach has little effect when adjustments are defined as the endpoint of a range.
When session is added to this analysis, we find that it has a significant main effect (p = 0.0307) and interaction with precision (p = 0.0574). Simple effects reveal that managers rather than partners drive the main effect of precision in the preceding analysis. Specifically, when a misstatement is the lower end of a range, managers are significantly less likely to waive adjustment than are partners (29 percent waived by managers vs. 49 percent waived by partners; p = 0.0057). When a misstatement is specified by a point estimate, managers are insignificantly less likely to waive adjustment than are partners (42 percent waived by managers vs. 51 percent waived by partners; p = 0.2155). Thus, in general managers appear less likely to waive adjustment of these cases than are partners, particularly when there is uncertainty about misstatement size.
Additional Analyses
Self Insight
Responses to debriefing questions indicate 69 percent (31 percent) of participants believe their adjustment decisions are (are not) influenced by whether the current-period or cumulative approaches are used for a client. However, when added to the overall analysis, "belief" does not interact significantly with materiality perspective (p = 0.5654), indicating that the effect of materiality perspective does not depend on whether auditors thinks it has an effect. Also, when separate analyses are run for each level of belief, materiality perspective is significant for both the "believe it influences judgments" group (p = 0.0001) and the "believe it does not influence judgments" group (p = 0.0086), suggesting that many auditors lack self-insight concerning the effect of materiality approach on their adjustment decisions.
Experience with Materiality Approach
Responses to debriefing questions indicate 8 percent (35 percent) of auditors assigned to the cumulative (current-period) treatments lacked prior experience with that treatment. When added to the overall analysis, "prior experience with assigned method" does not interact significantly with materiality perspective (p = 0.3881), indicating that the effect of materiality perspective does not depend on whether auditors have experience with the method they were assigned.
Judged Appropriateness of Materiality Approach
Responses to debriefing questions indicate 60 percent (40 percent) of participants believe the cumulative (current-period) approach is more appropriate in general. When added to the overall analysis, "method appropriateness" does not interact significantly with materiality perspective (p = 0.5024), indicating that the effect of materiality perspective does not depend on judged method appropriateness.
Judged Appropriateness of Rollover of Specific Misstatements
Responses to debriefing questions indicate a lack of consensus among auditors concerning whether particular errors are appropriate for "rollover" (i.e., offset) between periods when the current-period method is used. 77 percent indicated that rollover of cutoff errors was appropriate, and 52 percent indicated that rollover of bad debts reserves was appropriate. In general, auditors who consider the current-period method to be more appropriate were more likely to indicate that rollover of particular errors was appropriate (p = 0.0001). Also, analyses of individual cases often reveal a significant effect of appropriateness judgment, indicating that auditors considered whether rollover of a particular error was appropriate when making adjustment decisions. However, appropriateness never interacted with materiality approach or perspective in any analysis of auditors' adjustment decisions, indicating that the effects of materiality approach do not depend on judged appropriateness of rollover.
V. Discussion
The results of our experiment indicate a robust effect of materiality approach on auditors' adjustment decisions. Holding constant all information relevant to the company, prior waived adjustments and current proposed adjustments, auditors were more likely to require adjustment under the materiality approach that made the misstatement appear more material. This result held regardless of misstatement size, subjectivity, income effect, auditors' belief about whether approach influenced their judgments, or the presence of a prompt to consider the effect of the client's preferred accounting treatment on current and future quality of earnings.
The largest effect of materiality approach was observed for a case in which a large, repeating cutoff error increased current income. When evaluated under the cumulative approach, this case indicated an objective, income increasing effect of greater than 5 percent of net income, and only 23 percent of auditors waived adjustment; when evaluated under the current-period approach, the effect of the error was close to zero, and 70 percent of auditors waived adjustment.
This case highlights that differences in materiality approach can produce large differences between audit treatments of amounts that all auditors would agree are large and misstated.
One response to these results could be for standard setters to consider mandating either the cumulative or current-period approaches, or at least for them to require that materiality approach be disclosed clearly among the accounting policies described in financial statements.
However, as demonstrated in this study, the effects of approach are bi-directional, with the cumulative approach producing higher apparent materiality in some settings and the currentperiod approach producing higher apparent materiality in other settings. Thus, it is unclear which approach standard setters should mandate, or how financial-statement users would interpret a simple disclosure of approach. Perhaps a better alternative would be to require adjustment of amounts that are material under either approach.
The only case producing an insignificant effect of materiality approach involved a reserve misstatement that was defined (as required by FIN 14) as the low point of a range of possible values. Regardless of materiality approach, auditors were more likely to require adjustment of such "range defined" misstatements compared to misstatements that were defined by a point estimate, suggesting awareness that the actual amount of a "range-defined" misstatement might exceed the adjustment proposed. This case was also the only one for which we observed differences between partners and managers, with partners more likely to waive adjustment than managers. This result suggests that audit partners may counteract the conservatism that managers attempt to introduce with respect to imprecisely defined misstatements. 
2.
In practice, the "current-period" approach is often referred to as the "rollover" approach, since the effects of prior-period errors are "rolled over" to offset current-period errors and determine the net additional misstatement added in the current period. In practice, the cumulative approach is often referred to as the "iron curtain" approach, since no such offsetting is allowed (Panel on Audit Effectiveness 2000).
3.
For recent examples of these studies, see Hopkins (1996) with respect to hybrid securities, Kennedy et al. (1998) with respect to contingent liabilities, Hirst and Hopkins (1998) and Maines and McDaniel (2000) with respect to comprehensive income, Hopkins et al. (2000) with respect to business combinations, Luft and Shields (2001) with respect to intangibles, Dietrich et al. (2001) with respect to oil reserves, and Hirst et al. (2002) with respect to fair-value accounting.
4.
Consistent with the importance of this threshold, the firm providing participants requires consultation before auditors waive adjustments that exceed 5 percent of net income. 6. In section IV we describe this modification in more detail and consider how it affects our interpretation of results with respect to this case.
7.
Results are based on score statistics for Type 3 GEE Analysis using Proc GENMOD in SAS, version 8. P-values are computed based on the chi-square distribution.
8.
Participants also identified whether any adjustments would be included in current-period earnings or shown as a prior period adjustment. For most cases, adjustments were all reflected in current-period earnings, with only between 5 percent and 11 percent of adjustments identified as prior-period adjustments. However, prior-period adjustments were required more frequently for cases involving reductions of "cookie-jar" reserves (37 percent of adjustment for "small reserve" case C; 56 percent of adjustments for "large reserve" case E).
9.
Based on informal feedback received after the first session, we increased the prior-year error size of case D from $3.45 million to $5.45 million, which has the effect of increasing the materiality of the error when evaluated using a rollover approach. Thus, for this case "session" captures the joint effect of experience differences and the modification of error size.
10.
When Session (session 1 v. session 2-6) is added to the analysis, Session is significant (p = 0.0004), as is the Session by Case interaction (p = 0.0034). However, because the size of the misstatement in case D was increased between session 1 and sessions 2-6, we interpret this result as indicating that auditors are less likely to waive adjustment of larger misstatements. There is no three-way interaction between session, case and approach, indicating that the approach x case interaction does not vary between sessions.
11.
The low size in the reserve setting (3.25 percent) differs somewhat from the low size in the cutoff setting (2.36 percent). However, this interaction appears strong enough to appear under a number of treatment levels. Even if the misstatement in the reserve setting was low enough to produce no difference between materiality-approach treatments for case C, we would still anticipate a three-way interaction (i.e., because
12.
In addition to showing that materiality approach is particularly important for the large, objective, income-increasing cutoff error case F, this significant interaction also highlights that error size has a large effect on judgments under the cumulative approach, with the proportion of waived adjustments in the large error case F (23 percent)
significantly lower than the proportion in the small error case B (67 percent, p < 0.0001).
13.
In this analysis, the cumulative approach always provides a higher assessment of materiality for the objective (cutoff) cases, while the current-period approach always provides a higher assessment of materiality for the subjective (reserve-reduction) cases.
However, we have no theory suggesting that judgments should be affected by which approach produces the higher apparent materiality. Rather, we focus on the effects of between-approach differences in apparent materiality.
14. The slight difference in misstatement of $7.25 for the point estimate and $7.1 for the range's lower bound was designed to bias against finding that auditors would be more likely to require adjustment of a misstatement that was the low end of a range. The range's upper bound was $15.1.
Figure 1 Descriptions of Materiality Approach Included in Instructions
Current-Period Approach (Called the "Rollover Method" in Practice)
The rollover method recognizes that unadjusted differences identified in the previous year that were not corrected may reverse in the current period, and that certain other differences have a continuing, but probably offsetting, effect in future periods. Therefore, under the rollover method, the effect of each waived adjustment on the prior year's (scoresheet) should be separately evaluated to determine if it is appropriate to "roll over" its effect to the current year's (scoresheet). The impact of "rolled over" adjustments from the prior year's (scoresheet) is netted against the impact of proposed adjustments on the current year's (scoresheet) to assess the materiality of current-year unadjusted differences to net income and comprehensive income." Cumulative Approach (Called the "Iron-Curtain Method" in Practice)
The iron-curtain method recognizes that current-year proposed adjustments capture the cumulative effect of adjustments waived on the prior year's (scoresheet) as well as the effect of adjustments arising in the current year. Therefore, under the iron-curtain method, waived adjustments on the prior year's (scoresheet) are not relevant to considering adjustments proposed on the current year's (scoresheet). Only the impact of proposed adjustments on the current-year (scoresheet) is considered when determining the materiality of current-year unadjusted differences to net income and comprehensive income." Note: Shaded cells denote the materiality approach (current-period vs. cumulative) that yields the highest apparent materiality for that particular case. P-values are from one-sided tests of differences between the proportion waived under the approach that makes the misstatement appear less material and the proportion waived under the approach that makes the misstatement appear more material. Note: Shaded cells denote the approach (current-period vs. cumulative) that yields the highest apparent materiality for that particular case. P-values are from one-sided tests of differences between the proportion waived under the approach that makes the misstatement appear less material and the proportion waived under the approach that makes the misstatement appear more material. Note: Shaded cells denote the approach (current-period vs. cumulative) that yields the highest apparent materiality for that particular case. P-values are from one-sided tests of differences between the proportion waived under the approach that makes the misstatement appear less material and the proportion waived under the approach that makes the misstatement appear more material. 
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